{"id":243912,"date":"2024-10-19T16:00:53","date_gmt":"2024-10-19T16:00:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/bs-en-61508-62010\/"},"modified":"2024-10-25T10:58:34","modified_gmt":"2024-10-25T10:58:34","slug":"bs-en-61508-62010","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/bsi\/bs-en-61508-62010\/","title":{"rendered":"BS EN 61508-6:2010"},"content":{"rendered":"

IEC 61508-6:2010 contains information and guidelines on IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508 3. Annex A gives a brief overview of the requirements of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3 and sets out the functional steps in their application. Annex B gives an example technique for calculating the probabilities of hardware failure and should be read in conjunction with 7.4.3 and Annex C of IEC 61508-2 and Annex D. Annex C gives a worked example of calculating diagnostic coverage and should be read in conjunction with Annex C of IEC 61508-2. Annex D gives a methodology for quantifying the effect of hardware-related common cause failures on the probability of failure. Annex E gives worked examples of the application of the software safety integrity tables specified in Annex A of IEC 61508-3 for safety integrity levels 2 and 3. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 1998. This edition constitutes a technical revision. It has been subject to a thorough review and incorporates many comments received at the various revision stages. NEW!<\/span> Also available: \/2, containing all parts, together with a commented Redline version. Changes made in this 2nd edition are highlighted and commented by a leading world expert. This publication is of high relevance for Smart Grid.<\/p>\n

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PDF Pages<\/th>\nPDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
6<\/td>\nEnglish
CONTENTS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
10<\/td>\nINTRODUCTION <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
12<\/td>\n1 Scope <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
13<\/td>\nFigures
Figure 1 \u2013 Overall framework of the IEC\u00a061508 series <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
14<\/td>\n2 Normative references
3 Definitions and abbreviations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
15<\/td>\nAnnex A (informative) Application of IEC 61508-2 and of IEC 61508-3 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
19<\/td>\nFigure A.1 \u2013 Application of IEC\u00a061508-2 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
20<\/td>\nFigure A.2 \u2013 Application of IEC\u00a061508-2 (Figure A.1 continued) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
22<\/td>\nFigure A.3 \u2013 Application of IEC\u00a061508-3 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
23<\/td>\nAnnex B (informative) Example of technique for evaluating probabilities of hardware failure <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
24<\/td>\nFigure B.1 \u2013 Reliability Block Diagram of a whole safety loop <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
28<\/td>\nFigure B.2 \u2013 Example configuration for two sensor channels <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
29<\/td>\nTables
Table B.1 \u2013 Terms and their ranges used in this annex (applies to 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 1oo2D, 1oo3 and 2oo3) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
31<\/td>\nFigure B.3 \u2013 Subsystem structure <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
32<\/td>\nFigure B.4 \u2013 1oo1 physical block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
33<\/td>\nFigure B.5 \u2013 1oo1 reliability block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
34<\/td>\nFigure B.6 \u2013 1oo2 physical block diagram
Figure B.7 \u2013 1oo2 reliability block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
35<\/td>\nFigure B.8 \u2013 2oo2 physical block diagram
Figure B.9 \u2013 2oo2 reliability block diagram
Figure B.10 \u2013 1oo2D physical block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
36<\/td>\nFigure B.11 \u2013 1oo2D reliability block diagram
Figure B.12 \u2013 2oo3 physical block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
37<\/td>\nFigure B.13 \u2013 2oo3 reliability block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
38<\/td>\nTable B.2 \u2013 Average probability of failure on demand for a proof test interval of six months and a mean time to restoration of 8 h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
39<\/td>\nTable B.3 \u2013 Average probability of failure on demand for a proof test interval of one year and mean time to restoration of 8 h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
40<\/td>\nTable B.4 \u2013 Average probability of failure on demand for a proof test interval of two years and a mean time to restoration of 8 h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
41<\/td>\nTable B.5 \u2013 Average probability of failure on demand for a proof test interval of ten years and a mean time to restoration of 8 h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
42<\/td>\nFigure B.14 \u2013 Architecture of an example for low demand mode of operation
Table B.6 \u2013 Average probability of failure on demand for the sensor subsystem in the example for low demand mode of operation (one year proof test interval and 8\u00a0h\u00a0MTTR) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
43<\/td>\nTable B.7 \u2013 Average probability of failure on demand for the logic subsystem in the example for low demand mode of operation (one year proof test interval and 8\u00a0h\u00a0MTTR)
Table B.8 \u2013 Average probability of failure on demand for the final element subsystem in the example for low demand mode of operation (one year proof test interval and 8\u00a0h\u00a0MTTR) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
44<\/td>\nTable B.9 \u2013 Example for a non-perfect proof test <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
47<\/td>\nTable B.10 \u2013 Average frequency of a dangerous failure (in high demand or continuous mode of operation) for a proof test interval of one month and a mean time to restoration of 8\u00a0h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
48<\/td>\nTable B.11 \u2013 Average frequency of a dangerous failure (in high demand or continuous mode of operation) for a proof test interval of three month and a mean time to restoration of 8 h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
49<\/td>\nTable B.12 \u2013 Average frequency of a dangerous failure (in high demand or continuous mode of operation) for a proof test interval of six month and a mean time to restoration of 8 h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
50<\/td>\nTable B.13 \u2013 Average frequency of a dangerous failure (in high demand or continuous mode of operation) for a proof test interval of one year and a mean time to restoration of 8 h <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
51<\/td>\nFigure B.15 \u2013 Architecture of an example for high demand or continuous mode of operation
Table B.14 \u2013 Average frequency of a dangerous failure for the sensor subsystem in the example for high demand or continuous mode of operation (six month proof test interval and 8\u00a0h\u00a0MTTR) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
52<\/td>\nTable B.15 \u2013 Average frequency of a dangerous failure for the logic subsystem in the example for high demand or continuous mode of operation (six month proof test interval and 8 h MTTR)
Table B.16 \u2013 Average frequency of a dangerous failure for the final element subsystem in the example for high demand or continuous mode of operation (six month proof test interval and 8\u00a0h\u00a0MTTR) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
53<\/td>\nFigure B.16 \u2013 Reliability block diagram of a simple whole loop with sensors organised into 2oo3 logic <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
54<\/td>\nFigure B.17 \u2013 Simple fault tree equivalent to the reliability block diagram presented on Figure B.1
Figure B.18 \u2013 Equivalence fault tree \/ reliability block diagram <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
56<\/td>\nFigure B.19 \u2013 Instantaneous unavailability U(t) of single periodically tested components <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
57<\/td>\nFigure B.20 \u2013 Principle of PFDavg calculations when using fault trees <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
58<\/td>\nFigure B.21 \u2013 Effect of staggering the tests
Figure B.22 \u2013 Example of complex testing pattern <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
60<\/td>\nFigure B.23 \u2013 Markov graph modelling the behaviour of a two component system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
61<\/td>\nFigure B.24 \u2013 Principle of the multiphase Markovian modelling <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
62<\/td>\nFigure B.25 \u2013 Saw-tooth curve obtained by multiphase Markovian approach
Figure B.26 \u2013 Approximated Markovian model <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
63<\/td>\nFigure B.27 \u2013 Impact of failures due to the demand itself
Figure B.28 \u2013 Modelling of the impact of test duration <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
64<\/td>\nFigure B.29 \u2013 Multiphase Markovian model with both DD and DU failures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
65<\/td>\nFigure B.30 \u2013 Changing logic (2oo3 to 1oo2) instead of repairing first failure
Figure B.31 \u2013 “Reliability” Markov graphs with an absorbing state <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
67<\/td>\nFigure B.32 \u2013 “Availability” Markov graphs without absorbing states <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
68<\/td>\nFigure B.33 \u2013 Petri net for modelling a single periodically tested component <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
71<\/td>\nFigure B.34 \u2013 Petri net to model common cause failure and repair resources <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
72<\/td>\nFigure B.35 \u2013 Using reliability block diagrams to build Petri net and auxiliary Petri net for PFD and PFH calculations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
73<\/td>\nFigure B.36 \u2013 Simple Petri net for a single component with revealed failures and repairs <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
74<\/td>\nFigure B.37 \u2013 Example of functional and dysfunctional modelling with a formal language <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
75<\/td>\nFigure B.38 \u2013 Uncertainty propagation principle <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
78<\/td>\nAnnex C (informative) Calculation of diagnostic coverage and safe failure fraction \u2013 worked example <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
80<\/td>\nTable C.1 \u2013 Example calculations for diagnostic coverage and safe failure fraction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
81<\/td>\nTable C.2 \u2013 Diagnostic coverage and effectiveness for different elements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
82<\/td>\nAnnex D (informative) A methodology for quantifying the effect of hardware-related common cause failures in E\/E\/PE systems <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
84<\/td>\nFigure D.1 \u2013 Relationship of common cause failures to the failures of individual channels <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
90<\/td>\nTable D.1 \u2013 Scoring programmable electronics or sensors\/final elements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
91<\/td>\nTable D.2 \u2013 Value of Z \u2013 programmable electronics
Table D.3 \u2013 Value of Z \u2013 sensors or final elements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
92<\/td>\nTable D.4 \u2013 Calculation of \u03b2int or \u03b2D int <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
93<\/td>\nTable D.5 \u2013 Calculation of \u03b2 for systems with levels of redundancy greater than 1oo2 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
94<\/td>\nTable D.6 \u2013 Example values for programmable electronics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
95<\/td>\nFigure D.2 \u2013 Implementing shock model with fault trees <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
97<\/td>\nAnnex E (informative) Example applications of software safety integrity tables of IEC 61508-3 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
98<\/td>\nTable E.1 \u2013 Software safety requirements specification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
99<\/td>\nTable E.2 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 software architecture design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
100<\/td>\nTable E.3 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 support tools and programming language <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
101<\/td>\nTable E.4 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 detailed design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
102<\/td>\nTable E.5 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 software module testing and integration
Table E.6 \u2013 Programmable electronics integration (hardware and software) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
103<\/td>\nTable E.7 \u2013 Software aspects of system safety validation
Table E.8 \u2013 Software modification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
104<\/td>\nTable E.9 \u2013 Software verification
Table E.10 \u2013 Functional safety assessment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
106<\/td>\nTable E.11 \u2013 Software safety requirements specification
Table E.12 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 software architecture design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
107<\/td>\nTable E.13 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 support tools and programming language <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
108<\/td>\nTable E.14 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 detailed design
Table E.15 \u2013 Software design and development \u2013 software module testing and integration <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
109<\/td>\nTable E.16 \u2013 Programmable electronics integration (hardware and software) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
110<\/td>\nTable E.17 \u2013 Software aspects of system safety validation
Table E.18 \u2013 Modification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
111<\/td>\nTable E.19 \u2013 Software verification
Table E.20 \u2013 Functional safety assessment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
112<\/td>\nBibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Functional safety of electrical\/electronic\/ programmable electronic safety related systems – Guidelines on the application of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Published By<\/td>\nPublication Date<\/td>\nNumber of Pages<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BSI<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n2010<\/td>\n116<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":243914,"template":"","meta":{"rank_math_lock_modified_date":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false},"product_cat":[2641],"product_tag":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-243912","1":"product","2":"type-product","3":"status-publish","4":"has-post-thumbnail","6":"product_cat-bsi","8":"first","9":"instock","10":"sold-individually","11":"shipping-taxable","12":"purchasable","13":"product-type-simple"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product\/243912","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/product"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/243914"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=243912"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"product_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_cat?post=243912"},{"taxonomy":"product_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_tag?post=243912"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}