| PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10<\/td>\n | FOREWORD <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 13<\/td>\n | 0 Introduction 0.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 15<\/td>\n | 0.2 Use of extended assessment methods in Edition 4 0.3 Patent declaration <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 17<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 19<\/td>\n | 3 Terms, definitions, symbols, abbreviated terms and conventions 3.1 Terms and definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 26<\/td>\n | 3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms 3.2.1 Abbreviated terms <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 27<\/td>\n | 3.2.2 Symbols <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 28<\/td>\n | 4 Conformance 5 Basics of safety-related fieldbus systems 5.1 Safety function decomposition <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 29<\/td>\n | 5.2 Communication system 5.2.1 General 5.2.2 IEC 61158 fieldbuses <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 30<\/td>\n | 5.2.3 Communication channel types 5.2.4 Safety function response time <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 31<\/td>\n | 5.3 Communication errors 5.3.1 General 5.3.2 Corruption 5.3.3 Unintended repetition 5.3.4 Incorrect sequence <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 32<\/td>\n | 5.3.5 Loss 5.3.6 Unacceptable delay 5.3.7 Insertion 5.3.8 Masquerade 5.3.9 Addressing 5.4 Deterministic remedial measures 5.4.1 General 5.4.2 Sequence number 5.4.3 Time stamp <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 33<\/td>\n | 5.4.4 Time expectation 5.4.5 Connection authentication 5.4.6 Feedback message 5.4.7 Data integrity assurance 5.4.8 Redundancy with cross checking 5.4.9 Different data integrity assurance systems <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 34<\/td>\n | 5.5 Typical relationships between errors and safety measures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 35<\/td>\n | 5.6 Communication phases 5.7 FSCP implementation aspects <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 36<\/td>\n | 5.8 Models for estimation of the total residual error rate 5.8.1 Applicability 5.8.2 General models for black channel communications <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 37<\/td>\n | 5.8.3 Identification of generic safety properties <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 38<\/td>\n | 5.8.4 Assumptions for residual error rate calculations 5.8.5 Residual error rates 5.8.5.1 Explicit and implicit mechanisms <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 39<\/td>\n | 5.8.5.2 Residual error rate calculations 5.8.5.2.1 General 5.8.5.2.2 Contribution of data integrity errors (RRI) 5.8.5.2.3 Contribution of authenticity errors (RRA) 5.8.5.2.4 Contribution of timeliness errors (RRT) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 40<\/td>\n | 5.8.5.2.5 Contribution of masquerade errors (RRM) 5.8.6 Data integrity 5.8.6.1 Probabilistic considerations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 41<\/td>\n | 5.8.6.2 Deterministic considerations 5.8.6.3 Residual error probability for data integrity RPI 5.8.7 Authenticity 5.8.7.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 43<\/td>\n | 5.8.7.2 Rate of occurrence of misdirected SPDUs (RA) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 44<\/td>\n | 5.8.8 Timeliness 5.8.8.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 46<\/td>\n | 5.8.8.2 Rate of occurrence of incorrect sequence SPDUs (RT) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 47<\/td>\n | 5.8.9 Masquerade 5.8.9.1 General 5.8.9.2 Rate of occurrence for masqueraded SPDUs (RM) 5.8.10 Calculation of the total residual error rates 5.8.10.1 Based on the summation of the residual error rates <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 48<\/td>\n | 5.8.10.2 Based on other quantitative proofs 5.8.11 Total residual error rate and SIL <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 49<\/td>\n | 5.8.12 Configuration and parameterization for an FSCP 5.8.12.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 51<\/td>\n | 5.8.12.2 Configuration and parameterization change rate 5.8.12.3 Residual error rate for configuration and parameterization 5.9 Relationship between functional safety and security 5.10 Boundary conditions and constraints 5.10.1 Electrical safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 52<\/td>\n | 5.10.2 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) 5.11 Installation guidelines 5.12 Safety manual 5.13 Safety policy <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 53<\/td>\n | 6 Communication Profile Family 1 (Foundation\u2122 Fieldbus) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety 7 Communication Profile Family 2 (CIP\u2122) and Family 16 (SERCOS\u00ae) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 54<\/td>\n | 8 Communication Profile Family 3 (PROFIBUS\u2122, PROFINET\u2122) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety 9 Communication Profile Family 6 (INTERBUS\u00ae) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 55<\/td>\n | 10 Communication Profile Family 8 (CC-Link\u2122) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety 10.1 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8\/1 10.2 Functional Safety Communication Profile 8\/2 11 Communication Profile Family 12 (EtherCAT\u2122) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 56<\/td>\n | 12 Communication Profile Family 13 (Ethernet POWERLINK\u2122) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety 13 Communication Profile Family 14 (EPA\u00ae) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety 14 Communication Profile Family 17 (RAPIEnet\u2122) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 57<\/td>\n | 15 Communication Profile Family 18 (SafetyNET p\u2122 Fieldbus) \u2013 Profiles for functional safety <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 58<\/td>\n | Annex A (informative) Example functional safety communication models A.1 General A.2 Model A (single message, channel and FAL, redundant SCLs) A.3 Model B (full redundancy) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 59<\/td>\n | A.4 Model C (redundant messages, FALs and SCLs, single channel) A.5 Model D (redundant messages and SCLs, single channel and FAL) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 61<\/td>\n | Annex B (normative) Safety communication channel model using CRC-based error checking B.1 Overview B.2 Channel model for calculations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 62<\/td>\n | B.3 Bit error probability Pe <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 63<\/td>\n | B.4 Cyclic redundancy checking B.4.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 64<\/td>\n | B.4.2 Requirements for methods to calculate RCRC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 66<\/td>\n | Annex C (informative) Structure of technology-specific parts <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 69<\/td>\n | Annex D (informative) Assessment guideline D.1 Overview D.2 Channel types D.2.1 General D.2.2 Black channel D.2.3 White channel <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 70<\/td>\n | D.3 Data integrity considerations for white channel approaches D.3.1 General D.3.2 Models B and C <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 71<\/td>\n | D.3.3 Models A and D D.4 Verification of safety measures D.4.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 72<\/td>\n | D.4.2 Implementation D.4.3 “De-energize to trip” principle D.4.4 Safe state D.4.5 Transmission errors D.4.6 Safety reaction and response times D.4.7 Combination of measures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 73<\/td>\n | D.4.8 Absence of interference D.4.9 Additional fault causes (white channel) D.4.10 Reference test beds and operational conditions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 74<\/td>\n | D.4.11 Conformance tester <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 75<\/td>\n | Annex E (informative) Examples of implicit vs. explicit FSCP safety measures E.1 General E.2 Example fieldbus message with safety PDUs E.3 Model with completely explicit safety measures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 76<\/td>\n | E.4 Model with explicit A-code and implicit T-code safety measures E.5 Model with explicit T-code and implicit A-code safety measures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 77<\/td>\n | E.6 Model with split explicit and implicit safety measures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 78<\/td>\n | E.7 Model with completely implicit safety measures E.8 Addition to Annex B \u2013 impact of implicit codes on properness <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 79<\/td>\n | Annex F (informative) Legacy models for estimation of the total residual error rate F.1 General F.2 Calculation of the residual error rate <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 81<\/td>\n | F.3 Total residual error rate and SIL <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 82<\/td>\n | Annex G (informative) Implicit data safety mechanisms for IEC 61784\u00ad3 functional safety communication profiles (FSCPs) G.1 Overview G.2 Basic principles <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 83<\/td>\n | G.3 Problem statement: constant values for implicit data <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 86<\/td>\n | G.4 RP for FSCPs with random, uniformly distributed errimpl G.4.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 87<\/td>\n | G.4.2 Uniform distribution within the interval [0;2i-1], i \u2265 r <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 89<\/td>\n | G.4.3 Uniform distribution in the interval [1;2r-1], i = r <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 91<\/td>\n | G.5 General case G.6 Calculation of PID <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 93<\/td>\n | Annex H (informative) Residual error probability for example CRC codes (tables for verification of calculation methods) H.1 Overview H.2 Example of a 32 bit CRC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 98<\/td>\n | H.3 Example of a 16 bit CRC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 102<\/td>\n | H.4 Conclusion <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 104<\/td>\n | Annex I (informative) Communication channel model with uniformly distributed errors I.1 Overview I.2 Channel model for calculations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 106<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" BS EN IEC 61784-3. Industrial communication networks. Profiles – Part 3. Functional safety fieldbuses. General rules and profile definitions<\/b><\/p>\n |